I've long thought that Supreme Court were a bunch of political hacks who dressed up their personal opinions in pseudo-legalese and pomposity (see my earlier post). Indeed, viewing the Court in this way helped predict 8 of the 9 votes and the pundit reaction to those votes. None of those votes or responses interest me. What interests me is John Roberts' decision, the only time he has ever brought victory for the liberal wing of the Court.
There's only one person who can truly know what was going on in his head. But I can make a guess.
First, some brief background. Let's not pretend John Roberts was a closet commie biding his time until he could reveal his true principles. John Roberts was the guy (one of the five, at least) who ruled just a few months ago (this April!) that police officers can stick their gloved hands up people's bottoms and vajajays for any reason (i.e., seat belt violations, jaywalking, etc.) and that this doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure. He presided over the ludicrous 2010 ruling in Citizens United that money is speech is freedom. He worked for Reagan and was nominated to the Supreme Court by the that great liberal GW Bush.
Let's assume that in the ruling on Obamacare/the Affordable Care Act, the other Justices were split 4-4. Roberts then had a choice: vote for, against or abstain. Why would he choose to vote for and go against EVERY OTHER 5-4 VOTE HE HAS TAKEN since he became a Justice in 2005? John Roberts' decision can come down to one word: power.
1. Personal legacy. The aspirations and historical legacy of one man can have profound effect on their conduct. Prior to the Obamacare ruling, Democratic commentators were basically deriding Roberts as a partisan hack (according to Jeffrey Toobin, who for some reason lots of people seem to respect as a legal journalist, "Even more than Scalia, who has embodied judicial conservatism during a
generation of service on the Supreme Court, Roberts has served the
interests, and reflected the values, of the contemporary Republican
Party."). Today, there are thousands of Democratic commentators and media outlets saluting the fortitude and moderation of John G. Roberts, Jr. Although it's impossible to predict what may happen in the remaining, potentially very long time he has as Chief Justice, it's likely this will be in the first sentence of his obituary ("Chief Justice John Roberts, who oversaw a Court that solidified the standing of conservatism in American life while simultaneously reaching principled decisions on programs dear to liberals, died today..."). Hell, this decision may well get him Time's Man of the Year. With one fell swoop, the image of a rigid partisan has been transformed into one of wisdom and statesmanship.
2. The new swing vote. In a 4-4 Court, the swing Justice has all the power. He (they are males, in this case) can write the entire opinion himself. And he can write it in a way that has far-reaching, expansive interpretations that set the stage for future victories (see #5: Poison Pill). Prior to this ruling, Justice Kennedy had all the power on controversial decisions. But now, John Roberts can extract what he wants from the liberal Justices. In one move, John Roberts is now one of a handful of the most powerful people in America.
3. Supreme Court validation. Even before the recent Obamacare opinion (whose effect on public opinion of the Court has yet to be determined), the Supreme Court was unpopular by historical standards. The polling organization Rasmussen provides the following Supreme Court job approval ratings:
Excellent
8%
Good
28%
Fair
42%
Poor
17%
Not Sure
5%
Also unprecedented was Obama's famous, very public scolding of the Court in his 2010 State of the Union address. Certainly that wasn't enough to sway Roberts' opinion, but it must not have been a feel-good moment for a guy and a Court who basically try to live cloistered lives.
This ruling gets the Democrats off the Court's back. It provides a veneer of independence. And, perhaps most importantly, it provides cover for future major opinions (e.g., Yes, he overturned Roe v. Wade, but he also gave us Obamacare!).
4. Political effects. At first glance, this seems a political victory for the Republican Party, although the effects cannot yet be ascertained. Rightly or wrongly, the backlash to Obamacare brought lots of Republicans to the polls for the 2010 midterm shellackings. In a close race, every vote counts. If Romney ends up winning the election, Obamacare will be overturned anyways. And this decision probably helps Romney get out the Republican vote and win the election.
5. A poison pill interpretation for conservatives. Another significant point of the decision was the ruling that Obamacare is not covered under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (this is obviously distinct from a ruling of unconstitutionality). According to Laurence Tribe:
"In a step I had considered unlikely and entirely lacking in
precedential, textual and historical support, five members of the Court
determined that Congress did not possess authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate “inactivity.” ... With future Supreme Court offices occupied by appointees of a
President Romney, today’s limited holding could become the muse for
another, perhaps more successful, wave of attacks on federal power."
[Tribe himself rejects this "Poison Pill" interpretation, and I am quoting only parts of what he wrote in order to illustrate the argument.]
6. A tax. The ruling upholding almost all of Obamacare was based on the power of Congress to tax. Of course, Obama promised many, many times that this did not increase taxes. It's unclear how this will play out, but it has the potential to be a victory for Republicans, a la #5.
Although the validity of any of these points is open to discussion, I think it's important to keep some of them in mind as we try to read the tea leaves about the future direction of the Court. Roberts' decision may very well have been principled, but stating as such ignores the very real power he accrued for himself and his usual political allies
“The Oriental doesn't put the same high
price on life
as does
a Westerner….We valuelife
and human
dignity. They don't care about life and human dignity.”
General
William Westmoreland, Commander, US Army,
Vietnam
(Hearts and Minds, 1974)
“[Desegregation] was crucial to the
nation’s ability to win the Cold War with the Soviet Union.”
Secretary
of State Dean Rusk
(As I Saw It, 1990)
“I believe that as the barriers to
equal rights and opportunities for all in our Nation are broken down, the fact
that the United States
is a multiracial society will prove one of our greatest assets in the contest
of ideologies.”
Edward
Murrow, Director, United States Information Agency
(Senate
Commerce Committee Hearing, 1963)
Introduction:
Necessary Hypocrisies
Despite the
immense amounts of scholarship devoted to the civil rights movement and the
Cold War, few scholars have explored the interrelations between the two. One
finds that segregation tarnished America’s international reputation,
a problem that was ameliorated through controlling popular opinion.
At the time, the
Soviet Union presented an ideological
counterbalance to American hegemony (Chomsky 2003:69-72). The American system
represented capitalism, while the Soviet system represented communism. During
the 1950s and 1960s many countries that were formerly colonized were gaining
their independence. All of these newly independent countries, such as India, Ghana, Indonesia, and
many others, were majority nonwhite, and their citizens abhorred America’s racist
policies.
Because of the
economic dominance exerted by the two superpowers, these newly independent
colonies had three choices:
1. Become part
of the American-dominated capitalist system;
2. Become part
of the Soviet-dominated communist system; or,
3. Pursue their
paths independently of the superpowers.
For economic reasons, American
officials sought to incorporate the newly independent countries (Layne and
Schwarz 1993:5-6) into the American-dominated capitalist world economy (Wallerstein
2003:13-14). It was feared that negative perceptions of American race relations
would drive these newly independent countries into the Soviet economic system
or to independent paths. To counter this fearful prospect, American officials falsely
portrayed American race relations as egalitarian and democratic.
These chapters
will review the means by which this propaganda campaign was orchestrated.
Chapter One will examine the broad trends in American censorship and
promulgation of prominent personalities. Chapter Two will illustrate how the
word “communism” was a vacuous phrase that used to bolster the arguments of both
integrationists and segregationists within the context of a 1963 Senate hearing.
Chapter Three will depict the activities of the United States Information
Agency, which was the propaganda arm of the American government. These three
chapters are designed both to stand alone and to be complementary. Together, they
present a picture of a government concerned primarily with self-image, and
tangentially with justice. Indeed, major victories for the civil rights
movement were useful only as propaganda tools for the American government.
Throughout, this
paper will rely on a definition of propaganda provided by Cull, et al. (2003:318):
“Propaganda
is best seen as the deliberate attempt to influence public opinion through the
transmission of ideas and values for a specific purpose, not through violence
or bribery.” Furthermore, “modern political propaganda is consciously designed
to serve the interests, either directly or indirectly, of the propagandists and
their political masters.”
Propaganda
is not necessarily divorced from reality. Bogart (1976:131) notes that “truth
in itself is not enough. [Some types of] propaganda require ‘a truth that
registers as a truth.’” In other words, propaganda can have a basis in
objective reality, although the message will reflect the same ideology
regardless of the reality. Thus, in these chapters, “propaganda” will denote
non-objective, governmental campaigns to influence mass opinion for the benefit
of the government.[1]
Chapter One: Propaganda and
Diplomacy
American
officials considered containment of Soviet communism the most important facet
of the Cold War (Metz 1984:521). As part of containment, America sought to
dominate newly independent countries, most of which were majority nonwhite, by
instituting a capitalist economic system (Wood 1994:207) under propagandistic
guises of “freedom,” “democracy,” and other political slogans (Dossa
2007:889-890). On the home front, American repression of blacks belied such egalitarian
rhetoric. The 1950s and 1960s was a brutal time for American blacks. For most,
racism was a fact of life. Legalized segregation was a defining characteristic
of many Southern states. But these facts undermined America’s broad foreign policy
goals of expanding the territory under its economic dominion. American
officials worried that segregation served as a crucial ideological tool for the
Soviet Union (Fairclough 2002:84). Therefore,
domestic racism was problematic insofar as it jeopardized American economic control
of newly independent Third World countries. This
chapter will explore how Cold War considerations broadly shaped American
propaganda and diplomacy with respect to the 1950s and 1960s civil rights
movement.
American Propaganda
American
officials were well aware of the international implications of segregation and
sought to mitigate negative viewpoints. Skrentny (1998:251) argues that the
chief goal of American opinion makers was not to abolish inequitable policies
but to control public perception of the problem. Chomsky (2003:16) contends
that democratic governments influence public opinion through orchestrating
propaganda campaigns. American officials sought to depict a free America on the
road towards liberating its black underclass from the vestiges of racial
bondage, a lie by almost any standard.
Propaganda
included promoting uncritical cultural and intellectual icons. Government
reactions to civil rights scholarship amplified pro-government viewpoints while
censoring criticism. The government sponsored trips for famous entertainers who
echoed the State Department line (Eschen 1997:177-180). This cultural exchange
had significant effects. For example, the South African Bantu World opined that the Harlem Globetrotters were “one of the United States’ most
effective weapons in the Cold War”. The American government was also extending
its interests in social science research (Solovey 2001:173-176). The interplay
of the Cold War and civil rights is illustrated in the first international
Congress of Colored Writers, in Paris
in 1956. James Baldwin, the “prominent Black activist intellectual” (Marable
2004:11) orated that there was a significant difference between two groups of
the black race, because black Africans could not understand black Americans’
freedoms (Eschen 1997:174-175); Africans could not understand what it was like
to be free. Eschen laments “that one of the most searching critics of America in the
twentieth century could in this context defend the United States as a society that was
‘open’ and ‘free’.” Baldwin’s trip and,
tacitly, his speech, were paid for by the State Department. Here, Baldwin was ostensibly rebutting the critical
philosophies of W.E.B. Du Bois, who advocated uniting black diasporas with
African blacks (Conyers 2003:67).
Contrapuntally,
government propagandists tried to downplay the popular appeal of famous activists
like Du Bois and Malcolm X by disseminating scholarly refutations of their
arguments (Dudziak 2002:224-225). This included CIA funding of pro-government black
academics and scholarly societies (Eschen 1997:175-176). At the aforementioned 1956
Congress of Colored Writers, DuBois was prevented from defending his views, or
even attending the conference, because the State Department had revoked his
passport for the past six years (Dudziak 2002:62). Like DuBois, black
entertainer-activists with critical viewpoints did not travel under the
government’s good graces. Particularly prominent critics, such as Ella Baker
and Paul Robeson, were often denied international travel, spied on by the FBI, harassed
at its request and otherwise censored (Dudziak 2002:62-74).
American Diplomacy
American
image was not solely founded on direct prevarication. Policy considerations
were sometimes motivated by a desire to ameliorate oppressive conditions for
public relations purposes. Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk (1990:583-588),
argued that mitigating the discrimination encountered by foreign black
diplomats “depended on racial progress throughout Washington and indeed the entire country.”
In light of this attitude, in 1963 Rusk made a unique appearance before a Senate
Commerce Committee hearing on desegregating public accommodations[2]
(Romano 2000:546-548). According to Rusk, foreign black diplomats driving between
United Nations headquarters in New
York and embassies in Washington were being refused service at Maryland restaurants and
gas stations. Rusk believed desegregation “was crucial to the nation’s ability
to win the Cold War with the Soviet Union.”
The State Department would go on to give “its full weight to the Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 and 1965” (Rusk 1990:583-584), “for pragmatic reasons as well as
the simple rightness of the cause.”
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that the
American government was concerned over spreading lies and partial truths abroad
through promotion of supportive scholars and viewpoints and censorship of
dissent. The support for the civil rights movement from powerful sectors was
not primarily motivated by concern for human dignity. Indeed, in the lies in
support of the ‘greater good’ of civil rights, the greater good was ultimately exploitation
of the masses of destitute, nonwhite Third World
peoples. This rationale is not ironic, for it consistently seeks to help those
in power.
Chapter Two: Communism in a
Microcosm
From
July 1 to August 2, 1963,
the Senate Commerce Committee convened a hearing on “A Bill to Eliminate
Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate Commerce” (S. 1732
1963). In the end, this bill “became [sic] [part of] the Civil Rights Act of
1964” (Romano 2000:546). The hearing brought together a wide range of the most
influential government actors in the civil rights movement. Attorney General
Robert Kennedy opened the hearings with three days of testimony (Thomas
2002:22). Secretary of State Dean Rusk, making “a historic appearance” before a
domestic committee (Romano 2000:546), opined that the bill’s “passage was
crucial to the nation’s ability to win the Cold War.” Later, Alabama Governor
George Wallace, “the most famous symbol of white resistance” (Levy 2003:3),
came as a self-proclaimed “loyal American” (S. 1732 1963:434-435) to argue for
the protection of his conception of freedom. Other witnesses included Burke
Marshall, Roy Wilkins, Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., and twenty-eight governors. As
the only Southerner on the Committee, South
Carolina’s Strom Thurmond, famous for delivering the
longest filibuster in history, against the 1957 Civil Rights Act, complemented
Wallace’s vitriol. The New York Times published
approximately one article on the hearing per day for one month. E.W. Kenworthy,
who wrote eighteen of these articles, called the hearing “a three-ring show”
(Kenworthy August 4[3]). This
article will demonstrate that in this particular hearing, fears and accusations
of Communism were malleable ideological weapons for officials on both sides of
the civil rights movement. The use of these weapons are evidenced in: 1)
Kenworthy’s near-yellow journalism; 2) Rusk’s testimony; Wallace’s testimony;
and, 4) Thurmond’s interrogations of the two witnesses.
Kenworthy’s New
York Times Coverage
Kenworthy’s articles indicate the
power that anti-communist ideology held over the committee members – as well as
the media. The New York Times published
more than thirty articles on the Senate hearing during the time period July 1 –
August 4, 1963.
Leading the activity was Kenworthy, of later Pentagon Papers fame, who
published eighteen articles on the subject. If Kenworthy is taken at his word,
then Senator Thurmond had the most significant effect on the witnesses when he
attempted to link them with communism. “The only time Mr. Kennedy’s voice took
on an emotional timbre was when Mr. Thurmond” accused him of playing into the
Soviets’ hands by providing ammunition for Soviet criticism (Kenworthy July 2).
Thurmond also upset Secretary of State Rusk and Acting Secretary of Commerce
Franklin Roosevelt Jr. when he implied they were communists. This made Rusk
“drop his normal diplomatic manner of speaking” (Kenworthy July 11) and Roosevelt Jr. respond “angrily” (Kenworthy July 24).
Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
Witness
Rusk (586-588) contends that
President Kennedy asked him “to lead off the administration’s testimony” by
focusing on the bill’s effects on foreign affairs. This statement is important
for two reasons. First, it was not Rusk, but the President’s brother who began
the testimony on behalf of the executive branch. Second, of all the sources,
only here is Rusk’s motive asserted. President Kennedy’s directive has
important implications for how one views Rusk’s testimony. Indeed, it brings
the veracity of his testimony into question. Did Rusk believe in his most
grandiose statements, that if facilities along the nation’s highways weren’t
desegregated then “it would be regarded as a diminution of our commitment to
this great idea of human dignity” (Kenworthy July 11)? Senator Thurmond
seemingly catches Rusk’s inconsistency (S. 1732 1963:302):
Thurmond:
When did you, as Secretary of State, tell the President that you felt that
Congress should pass these laws because the lack of such laws was hurting our
foreign relations?
Rusk:
Senator, it isn’t customary for a Cabinet officer to discuss the dates or
details of conversations with the President.
Regardless of Rusk’s motives, this
example indicates the tone for his entire testimony. Few Northern Senators
elected even to question Rusk; those that did chose not to pose difficult
questions. However, Rusk faced serious questioning from Thurmond (S. 1732
1963:288-319). Thurmond’s questioning reveals a logic that dismantles the
objective arguments for civil rights. Thurmond discovers that Rusk’s reasoning
is hypocritical. For example, in response to Thurmond’s second question, Rusk
testified that he would not cut off aid to foreign governments that practice
discrimination. Later, Thurmond intimated that Rusk’s concerns with the
negative impacts of Soviet criticism of American race relations gave credence
to it. An adjourning bell cut off Thurmond’s intense questioning. Afterward, Rhode
Island Senator John Pastore’s conclusion that Rusk had “been one of the most
effective witnesses that ha[d] ever appeared before this Commerce Committee”
drew an ovation. In response, Thurmond lamented that “the audience here is
packed with civil righters and left wingers.”
Alabama Governor George Wallace,
Witness
If Rusk was conciliatory and cogent,
Governor Wallace (S. 1732 1963:434-477) was condemnatory and caustic and
reveals a different type of red-baiting. As an example of the style of his
testimony, the first page of his opening statement reads: “The leaders of the
Federal Government have so misused the Negroes for selfish political reasons
that our entire concept of liberty and freedom is now in peril.” The second
page of his testimony is devoted almost entirely to criticizing “Martin Luther
King and his pro-Communist friends.” The third page in part states: “I will
tell you what this Senate bill 1732 does: It places upon all businessmen and
professional people the yoke of involuntary servitude. It should be designated
as the ‘Involuntary Servitude Act of 1963.’” In Wallace’s view, desegregation
“constitute[d] the first step towards land reform…a long step in a socialistic
scheme of government which will bring the total destruction of private property
rights” (441). Indeed, if Governor Wallace “were caught sitting, consorting
with a Communist, I dare say this administration would already have
investigated me” (467).
If
all the Senators except for Thurmond supported Rusk, the dynamics were reversed
with Governor Wallace. The Chairman of the Committee, Washington state Senator Warren
Magnuson, broke off Wallace’s bombastic opening statement with the stern
rebuttal that “we are not going to be intimidated by anyone.” But Wallace would
not be dissuaded. He soon opined: “I am not saying for one instant that every
member of the Negro race is a mobster, I am saying the leaders and those who
have participated in these demonstrations are. A President who sponsors
legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1963 should be retired from public
life.”
Unlike
Thurmond, Wallace had virtually no logical consistency. Wallace stated that “I
have never made a single statement in my whole political career…in which I
reflected on a man because of his color.” Humorously, Chairman Magnuson
interjected, “our guests are going to have to refrain from making loud
comments.”
Thurmond’s examination of Wallace
used up the remainder of the time for testimony. Thurmond led Wallace down a
simple path of racist logic. Thurmond’s questions are well represented by the
following one: “If a man tried to stand up for the Constitution, isn’t it a
fact that some of the liberal news media today try to claim he is a racist?”
Most of Thurmond’s queries were such thinly veiled reformulations of the
earlier arguments he put forth to Rusk.
Conclusion
This
chapter has demonstrated the salience that communism held in a particular
Senate hearing on integration. This hearing was chosen for three reasons, as intimated
in the chapter title, “Communism in a Microcosm.” First, the hearing illustrates
well the attitudes of prominent officials and a respected journalist towards
communism during the civil rights movement. Secondly, it indicates the important
interstices between the Cold War and civil rights for government ideologues on both
sides of the civil rights issue. Thirdly, despite the importance of the
hearing, little has been written about it. Pickerill’s (2004:86-89) book
briefly delves into the testimony. In Loevy’s three hundred and eighty page
edited history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, only a footnote (Loevy 1997:164-165)
indicates that this bill was one of two predecessors to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Dudziak (2002:184-186) mentions Rusk’s testimony, and only briefly.
Romano’s lengthy article attempts to address why Rusk would testify on a
nominally domestic bill, but addresses the hearing itself only on three pages
(2000:546-548). The lack of scholarship on this hearing is surprising, and
presents potent grounds for further, broader research beyond the question of
the impact of communism as a propagandistic slogan.
Chapter
Three: The Illusory Voice
The United States Information Agency
(USIA) was “one of the five major foreign affairs agencies of the United States
government” (Elder 1968:x), the others being the CIA, Departments of State and
Defense, and USAID. Of these agencies, Elder maintains that the USIA was the
least recognized. Two factors contributed to this relative anonymity. First, the
public mission of the USIA was “to inform and influence peoples abroad” (FRC 68
A 1415 1961). Stated more clearly internally, USIA Director Edward Murrow wrote
that “we are not in the news business as such, but in the business of
furthering U.S.
objectives through information activities abroad” (FRC 68 A 4933 1962). Secondly,
the USIA sought to efface the origin of its own activities. Murrow advised:
“Receptivity to USIA media output is nearly
always greater when the output is not attributed to the Agency or the U. S.
Government. I have therefore instructed our field posts not to carry USIA
attribution on pamphlets, motion pictures, television shows and other media
products (but excluding [sic] periodicals) except when local custom or law
dictates otherwise.”
In
short, the USIA was the propaganda arm of the American government (Cull, et al.
2003:420).
As with the American
government generally, USIA employees recognized the dualism of propaganda and
truth with respect to the civil rights movement. On the one hand, “Racial and
Ethnic Progress” (Elder 1968:89) was one of five themes for Agency propaganda.
On the other, Murrow opined “that as the barriers to equal rights and
opportunities for all in our Nation are broken down, the fact that the United
States is a multiracial society will prove one of our greatest assets in the
contest of ideologies” (S. 1732:16-17). This chapter will explore how the USIA dealt
with the paradox of propaganda and truth in relation to the 1950s and 1960s
civil rights movement.
USIA: Propaganda
As
part of its research into public opinion, the USIA reported to American
officials throughout the 1950s and 1960s that domestic racial discrimination
was the foremost criticism of America among the international community (Dudziak
2002:56, 166, 208). As long as segregation existed, these opinions could only be
countered through propaganda.
The
USIA fulfilled its mission with great energy. The USIA cabled daily its pro-American
media to its dozens of information bureaus, which were housed within American
embassies (Elder 1968:7-10). It distributed propagandistic movies and radio
shows through its Voice of American broadcasting network. The USIA also
published books, including English textbooks. Other mediums could be disguised as scholarship.
For example, the USIA released “The Negro in American Life” (Dudziak 2002:49),
an informational pamphlet presenting American race relations as utopian. In all
these cases, the American government held the moral high ground in race
relations.
Audiences
were carefully selected as targets for propaganda. For example, Murrow noted
that “African students studying in Russia…are a receptive target for
information, and could be particularly useful in their travels to other European
capitals and returning home” (FRC 68 A 4933 1962). Similarly, “feature stories
dealing with Negro progress in the U.S. are good output for West Africa” (Bogart 1976:108). As in the Peace Corps
(Dudziak 2002:157), in USIA media a black person was a “useful” tool for
propaganda. In addition to such “directly influential persons” (Bogart
1976:56), the USIA also focused on “mass media operators” and “the cultural
elite,” in order to legitimize the lies of the officials of the American
government.
USIA: Partial Truths
USIA
officials recognized that American race relations posed difficulties that could
not necessarily be fixed by propaganda (S. 1732:16-17). When the civil rights
movement gained important victories, a partial truth could be presented and its
negative qualities effaced. Readers should keep in mind a crucial qualifier when
analyzing ‘partial truths.’ According to Bogart (1976:131), “truth in itself is
not enough. Propaganda requires ‘a truth that registers as a truth.’”
Major victories for
black equality, such as the Brown
decision, James Meredith’s admission to the University of Mississippi, the March
on Washington in 1963 and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 (Dudziak 2002:107-109,
165, 188-198, 210-213, respectively), were immediately used in USIA international
press releases. One theme predominated: civil rights victories were examples of
American democracy, which demonstrated the morality of the majority of the
American people when confronted with the racist tendencies of a few marginalized
bigots.
Demonstrating
its usual treatment of partial truths, the USIA made a faux-documentary for the
civil rights movement that focused on the 1963 March on Washington (Eschen 1997:216-217). In The March, a diverse group of harmonious
marchers are portrayed as quintessential American citizens. Of the speeches,
“only Martin Luther King Jr.’s speech was included;” however, King’s criticism
of the American government was removed in order to focus on “the
forward-looking ‘dream’ segment.” Additionally, Eschen points out that the protestors’
motivations are unexamined.
Conclusion
The
chapter has illustrated the myriad efforts of the USIA to brainwash its
audiences into believing that America
was a paragon of racial concord. In the mid-1960s, USIA’s audience was
estimated at over 1 billion people, or approximately one third of the world’s
population (Elder 1968:1, 10). In addition, the USIA had a budget of $170
million and more than 10,000 employees. The power of the USIA should not be
underestimated. Officials recognized (Bogart 1976:22) that accepting USIA
propaganda in terms of the racial question could open the door for further
opinion molding on broader American foreign policy objectives.
Dudziak
(2002:235-242) maintains that the dual campaign of lies and partial truths worked.
USIA activity reached its crescendo and ultimate success in the mid-1960s, when
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 offered a façade of legal equality. Hereafter,
“foreign opinion was [now] developing along the lines the USIA and State
Department had long hoped for” (Dudziak 2002:241) and international
condemnation of American racism declined to virtually zero. Despite the reality
of entrenched racism (Sitkoff 1993:210-235), American propaganda, bolstered by
partial truths, had succeeded in its mission.
Interestingly,
in 1964 Carl Rowan, an African-American, was appointed to head the USIA. Unfortunately,
Elder (1968) and Bogart’s (1976) extensive histories of the USIA do not
speculate as to a possible racial motivation, a possibility for future
research.
Conclusion:
A Completed Campaign?
Self-interest
and hypocrisy were key features of American foreign policy with respect to the
civil rights movement. This paper has critical implications for scholars as
well as the public. Scholars must be wary of revisionist histories that seek to
depict a disinterested or benevolent American government with respect to the
civil rights movement. Revisionist histories of this type mirror the propaganda
reviewed in these chapters. A cursory examination of the facts shows this
depiction to be false. In reality, government officials used civil rights as a
propaganda weapon in order to secure economic domination over emerging Third World nations. For the government and its
propagandists, mired in lies, civil rights were utilitarian.
For the those
who may dismiss the fallacy of foreigners who believed government
self-adulation about egalitarian race relations, it is instructive to remember
that the civil rights movement has declined in America from its 1960s heights,
despite, at best, marginal economic gains following civil rights legislation in
this country.
The idea that
propaganda has ceased to be a vital component of American foreign affairs is an
illusion. In 1999, the Bureau of International Information Programs replaced
the USIA as chief propaganda arm of the American government. The Voice of
America (VOA) radio network continues to operate. Its “journalistic code” (Voice
of America 2009) states in part:
“Adhering to the principles outlined in the Charter,
VOA reporters and broadcasters must strive for accuracy and objectivity in all
their work. They do not speak for the U.S. government. They accept no treatment
or assistance from U.S.
government officials or agencies that is more favorable or less favorable than
that granted to staff of private-sector news agencies. Furthermore, VOA
professionals, careful to preserve the integrity of their organization, strive
for excellence and avoid imbalance or bias in their broadcasts.”
The “objectivity” of Voice of America should make
the readers of this paragraph laugh out loud. The “fast facts” (Voice
of America
2009) on its website claim an audience of over 130
million people per week, as well as “the largest
integrated digital audio system in the world.” One may ask, are we and
others now being propagandized? And if one looks at the overwhelming evidence,
the answer is, yes. The public must eschew supposedly
unbiased information from government sources.
Self-interest,
hypocrisy, and the practical applications of human rights continue to
predominate within respected circles supposedly far removed from propagandistic
coercion. For example, on April 25, Nicholas Kristof (2009), the most liberal
opinion columnist for the New York Times,
called for an inquiry into the American government’s support of torture:
“because
otherwise the next major terror attack — and there will be one — will be
followed by Republican claims that the president’s wimpishness [sic] left America
vulnerable. His agenda on health care, climate change and education will then
risk a collapse into dream dust. The way to inoculate his agenda is to seek
common ground through a nonpartisan commission. Second, a commission could help
restore America’s
standing by distancing ourselves from past abuses.”
In
a democracy the public presumably have a right to some control over the actions
of its government. It is extremely unlikely that many people would choose to be
indoctrinated. In a somewhat free and open country like our own, the possibilities
for reform are much greater than in totalitarian societies. The more the facts
are known, the less able the government is able to resist them. The changing mission
statements of the propaganda arms of the U.S. government from 1961 to today is
evidence of a probable shift in public attitudes – and the need for government
propagandists to hide behind greater façades. Thus, as long as people continue
to chip away at the mountain of injustice, there is hope that one day it will
be dismantled.
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[1] For a further discussion of the
definition of propaganda, see Cull, et al. 2003:317-322.
[2] Related aspects of this hearing
are examined in Chapter Two.
[3] Due to the large number of
Kenworthy (1963) references, his articles are cited by day.
